Introduction
I was asked recently by The vonLoewenfeldt Group to put together an article about car bombs, or Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), as they are more commonly known today. Little did I know when I volunteered to do this project, that it would rekindle in me a sense of awe related to the tactical and strategic significance of these devices, and result in a three-part series of articles, rather than one, what I thought would be, relatively short article. That said, I would also like to acknowledge that much of the raw data for my analysis comes from previous reports prepared by friends and colleagues like Roger Davies from the UK, Michael Cardash from Israel, and Dr. Kirk Yeager from the US, so I am simply standing on the shoulders of giants.
In reality, I could summarize the threat from VBIEDs by simply stating that they have been a persistent and evolving challenge to global security for more than four decades, and even further if you want to look back at incidents involving animal-drawn carts, carriages, and wagons. However, in just considering motorized ground transportation, we have a wide swath of data to look at, from the devastating Beirut barracks bombing in 1983, to the sophisticated operations of ISIS and today’s emerging autonomous delivery systems. In short, VBIEDs represent one of terrorism’s most destructive and adaptable weapons.
In this three-part series, I examine the comprehensive evolution of VBIED threats, tactics, and countermeasures across distinct historical periods. Drawing from extensive analysis of thousands of documented incidents, these reports trace how vehicle bombs have transformed from relatively simple devices into highly sophisticated weapons systems, while security measures have similarly advanced in response.
Part one covers the foundational period from the 1980s through 2001, establishing the baseline tactics that would later evolve. Part two examines the unprecedented surge in VBIED deployment during 2001-2007, particularly in Iraq, where over 3,000 documented attacks created a laboratory for rapid tactical innovation. The final installment analyzes the most recent developments from 2007-2025, including ISIS’s industrial-scale VBIED production facilities, the integration of commercial technologies, and the emergence of remote-controlled delivery systems.
Together, these reports are intended to provide security professionals, policymakers, and analysts with crucial insights into the cyclical nature of threat adaptation and defensive response that will shape future VBIED challenges. Understanding this evolution is essential for developing effective protection strategies for critical infrastructure and civilian populations worldwide.
So without further ado…
Analysis of Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Incidents Prior to 2001
Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) have been a significant threat in modern terrorism, with a history that predates the 21st century. Part 1 of this analysis focuses on VBIED incidents prior to 2001, examining their geographical distribution, tactical methodologies, and the evolution of countermeasures during this period.
Geographical Distribution of VBIED Attacks (Pre-2001)
Early VBIED Hotspots
Before 2001, VBIED attacks were concentrated in regions experiencing political instability and conflict. The Middle East, particularly Lebanon and Israel/Palestine, was a focal point due to ongoing sectarian and nationalist tensions. The 1983 Beirut barracks bombing by Hezbollah, which killed over 300 people, marked one of the earliest and most devastating VBIED attacks in history.
In South Asia, Sri Lanka’s civil war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) featured extensive use of VBIEDs, including both land and sea-based attacks. The LTTE pioneered the use of suicide truck bombs and boat bombs, demonstrating a high level of tactical sophistication.
Europe experienced VBIED attacks primarily through nationalist and separatist movements. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) conducted numerous car bombings in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain, often targeting economic and infrastructure sites with warnings provided to minimize casualties. Similarly, the Basque separatist group ETA used VBIEDs in Spain, focusing on government and military targets while also providing advance warnings.
Global Reach of VBIED Terrorism
While the primary hotspots were in the Middle East and South Asia, VBIED incidents also occurred in other regions. The United States experienced a significant VBIED attack in 1995 with the Oklahoma City bombing, which targeted a federal building and resulted in 168 fatalities. This event highlighted the potential for domestic terrorism to employ VBIEDs effectively.
In Africa, groups like the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) began using VBIEDs in the late 1990s, targeting government and civilian sites. This marked an early phase of VBIED adoption by extremist groups in North Africa.
Tactical Methodologies and Explosives Used (Pre-2001)
Types of Explosives and Vehicle Selection
Prior to 2001, VBIEDs typically employed a range of explosives, including military-grade materials when available and homemade explosives (HMEs) like ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO) mixtures. The choice of explosives often depended on availability rather than preference. For example, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing used a large ANFO charge, while the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing also utilized ANFO in a rented truck.
Vehicle selection varied based on target requirements and operational needs. Large trucks were used for high-casualty attacks, such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, which involved a Mercedes-Benz truck carrying approximately 5,000 pounds of explosives. Smaller vehicles like cars and motorcycles were used for more targeted attacks or in areas with limited access.
Detonation Mechanisms and Initiation Methods
Initiation methods for VBIEDs before 2001 primarily included time-delayed fuzes and command-detonated systems. Suicide VBIEDs were less common during this period but began to emerge, particularly among groups like Hezbollah and the LTTE. The use of remote-controlled detonation was also documented, often in ambush scenarios where timing was critical.
Vehicle Disguise and Concealment
Attackers frequently disguised VBIEDs by using vehicles that blended with local traffic or by hiding explosives within legitimate cargo. This tactic allowed bombers to approach targets without arousing suspicion. For instance, the LTTE used vehicles disguised as civilian transport to carry out attacks in Sri Lanka.
Terrorist Groups and Their VBIED Preferences (Pre-2001)
Global Jihadist Groups
Before 2001, global jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda were beginning to adopt VBIEDs as part of their operational repertoire. While not yet as prevalent as in later years, Al-Qaeda’s early involvement in VBIED attacks was evident in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which used truck bombs to devastating effect.
Nationalist and Separatist Organizations
Nationalist and separatist groups were among the most prolific users of VBIEDs before 2001. The IRA and ETA, as mentioned, frequently employed car bombs in their respective campaigns, often providing warnings to minimize civilian casualties. The LTTE in Sri Lanka also extensively used VBIEDs, including sophisticated suicide truck bombs, as part of their military strategy against government forces.
Impact of Countermeasures on VBIED Effectiveness (Pre-2001)
Physical Security Measures
Physical security measures, such as checkpoints and barriers, were implemented in response to VBIED threats. However, these early measures were often less sophisticated than those developed later. The use of vehicle barriers and standoff distances became more common, particularly around high-value targets like embassies and government buildings.
Intelligence Operations
Intelligence-led operations played a crucial role in disrupting VBIED networks. Arrests of key operatives and seizure of explosive materials were critical in preventing attacks. However, the pre-2001 period saw limited technological integration into intelligence operations compared to later years.
Successful vs. Failed VBIED Attempts: Comparative Factors (Pre-2001)
Factors in Failed VBIED Operations
Failed VBIED operations often resulted from technical malfunctions, initiation system failures, or premature detonations. Intelligence operations and public vigilance also contributed to foiled attacks, as tips from civilians sometimes led to the discovery and neutralization of VBIEDs before detonation.
Determinants of Successful VBIED Attacks
Successful VBIED attacks typically involved effective deception, operational security, and technical proficiency in bomb construction. Groups that could maintain secrecy during planning phases and employ reliable initiation systems achieved higher success rates. The use of large explosive payloads and strategic targeting also contributed to the impact of successful attacks.
Conclusion: The Pre-2001 VBIED Landscape
The pre-2001 VBIED landscape was characterized by a mix of nationalist, separatist, and emerging global jihadist threats. While the frequency and sophistication of attacks were not as high as in later years, the period laid foundational elements for future VBIED tactics. The evolution of countermeasures during this time was primarily reactive, with a focus on physical security and basic intelligence operations. As VBIED threats continued to evolve, so did the need for more integrated and proactive security strategies.
Author: Dr. Edwin A. Bundy | Ph.D. in Forensic Science| Ph.D. in Education | Certified International Post Blast Investigator | Former Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Technician
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